23 Id. at 1035. 24 Id. at 1034. 25 Id. at 1037. 26 Id. at 1038. 27 Id. at 1038. 6 instead of 0.09 ppm or 0.07 ppm:
EPA explains that its choice [of 0.08] is superior to . . . 0.09 ppm, because more people are exposed to more serious effects at 0.09 than at 0.08. . . . In defending the decision not to go down to 0.07, EPA never contradicts the intuitive proposition, confirmed by data in its staff paper, that reducing the standard to that level would bring about comparable changes. 23 The majority then reasoned that EPA's construction violates the nondelegation doctrine by conferring on EPA impermissibly broad discretion to decide "how much is too much." 24 According to the majority, "EPA's formulation of its policy judgment leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair below the concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog." 25 The majority then turned to the question of the appropriate remedy for EPA's unconstitutional statutory construction. The majority declined to hold that the statute itself is invalid, partly because such a holding is precluded by Supreme Court precedents, and partly because of the majority's belief that a constitutional construction of section 109(b) "is or may be available." 26 Instead, it remanded the proceeding to EPA with instructions that EPA adopt "determinate, binding standards." 27 The majority recognized that this remedy does not respond to a "key function of" the nondelegation doctrine --to 28 Id. at 1038. 29 Id. at 1038. 30 Id. at 1038-1040. 31 Id. at 1057-1058. 32 Id. at 1059. 33 See Wagner, supra. note 4.
7 "ensure . . . that important social policy choices are made by Congress . . .." 28 The majority ascribed two other valuable functions to its remedy, however --it will limit agency discretion, and it will provide a basis for judicial review of agency exercises of discretion. 29 In order to serve those functions, it seems obvious that the construction must bind the agency for the indefinite future. The majority then suggested potential "determinate, binding standards" EPA might adopt on remand.
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The dissenting judge referred to the many circuit court decisions that have upheld and applied CAA section 109(b) and to the many Supreme Court decisions that have upheld delegations much less determinate than section 109(b). 31 He also adopted a different interpretation of EPA's decisionmaking process. Like the majority, the dissent illustrated his point with reference to EPA's choice of 0.08 ppm, rather than 0.09 or 0.07, as the eight-hour ozone standard. According to the dissenting judge, EPA based it choice of 0.08 ppm not on differences in degrees of harm to human health but on differences in kinds of harm to human health.
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In the next section, I will argue that both opinions in ATA are symptomatic of what Wendy
Wagner calls the science charade --demanding more from science than it can deliver and finding more in science than is there. 33 Before I begin that discussion, it is important to recognize the hyperbole in the 34 Id. at 1037. 35 See William Logan, Mortality in the London Fog Incident, 1952, The Lancet, Feb. 4, 1053, at 336-338. 36 175 F. 3d at 1036-1037. 37 62 Fed. Reg. 38655-38656, 38859-38860. 8 majority opinion. The majority says that EPA is "free to pick any point between zero and a hair below the concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog." 34 That assertion is a gross exageration. Three data points illustrate the extreme hyperbole in the court's description of the upper boundary of EPA's discretion. First, the London Killer Fog of 1952 is believed to have killed about 4,000 people per week. 35 Second, those catastrophic consequences of air pollution resulted from concentration levels approximately fifty times the maximum levels permitted by the particulate and ozone standards in effect before EPA conducted the rulemakings at issue. 36 Third, numerous studies completed after EPA set the prior standards have found that concentrations of ozone and particulates below the prior standards produce health effects more severe and more widespread than EPA had reason to believe when it set the prior standards. 37 Thus, in order to defend a decision to set new standards that are "a hair below the concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog," EPA would have to say something like: "In light of the new evidence that suggests more severe health effects than we previously believed to result from ozone and particulates in concentrations lower than the ceilings we previously established, we hereby increase fifty-fold the primary ozone and particulate standards and permit concentrations that we estimate will produce 3900 deaths per week, a mere 202,800 deaths per year. We conclude that these new, relaxed standards that allow greater pollution than the United States has ever experienced are 'requisite 38 Indeed, that seems to be the most plausible interpretation of "requisite to the public health" with an "adequate margin for safety." 39 EPA repeatedly referred to all of the adverse health effects, including deaths, of particulates and ozone as lying along a "continuum" with no "discernable threshold" below which the pollutants have no adverse health effects. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 38656, 38659, 38672, 38859, 38862-38863. 40 175 F. 3d at 1038 note 4. 9 to protect the public health' with an 'adequate margin of safety.'" No court would uphold such a decision. Scientific uncertainty imposes significant limits on the practical ability of courts to review agency policy decisions, but courts are not quite as impotent as the ATA majority asserts. Of course, no agency would make such an absurd decision anyway.
The majority's description of the bottom of EPA's range of discretion may be accurate, however. The language of section 109(b) is susceptible to a plausible interpretation that would authorize EPA to set standards that produce zero deaths attributable to criteria pollutants, 38 and the available data can support a finding that only zero concentrations of ozone and particulates will avoid all loss of life caused by ozone or particulates. 39 EPA has the discretion to choose a zero level of permissible concentration, however, only if courts are the sole source of limits on EPA's discretion.
They are not. As I will argue in parts IV and VI, the President is a far more important source of constraints on agency discretion. No President would seriously consider allowing EPA to set primary ozone and particulate standards at zero. As the ATA majority recognized, standards set at a concentration of zero would require complete deindustrialization plus implementation of programs to remove all nonanthropogenic sources of particulates and ozone. 40 A zero standard is almost certainly unattainable, and no President would seriously consider adoption of a standard that even approaches 41 There are times and places where ozone concentrations exceed 0.07 ppm solely as a result of nonanthropogenic sources. 173 F. 3d at 1036. A high proportion of ozone and particulates have their origin in nonanthropogenic sources. Thus, for instance, about half of the particulates in the air in Florida originate in nonanthropogenic sources in Africa. See Science Notebook, A Breath of Africa in Miami, The Washington Post, July 19, 1999, at A9. 42 See text at notes 117-126, 152-157 infra. 43 See generally Albert Gore, Earth in the Balance (1992). 44 See text at notes 117-126, 152-157 infra. 10 zero. Even an ozone standard of 0.07 ppm would require complete elimination of all anthropogenic sources of ozone in some locations at some times.
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Once you add the President to the courts as a source of constraints on agency discretion, EPA's range of discretion in the ozone context probably is no greater than 0.07 to 0.10 ppm, given present technology and our present understanding of the relationship between ozone and human health.
Obviously, President Clinton was willing to acquiesce in a 0.08 ppm standard. It is fair to infer that he would not have been willing to acquiesce in a standard of 0.07 or 0.09 ppm. 42 It is quite possible that hypothetical future President Gore would be willing to acquiesce in a 0.07 or 0.075 ppm standard,
given his well-publicized views on the environment. 43 It is also quite possible that hypothetical future 12 all important questions forces scientists and agencies to exaggerate the extent to which science can, or has, answered an important question. As Wagner showed, the science charade manifests itself in many ways that distort decisionmaking and that render it difficult for anyone to understand how any healthrelated decision was made. 49 Thus, for instance, scientists and agencies routinely disguise the important value judgments and massive uncertainties that inhere in all health-related regulatory decisions. 50 We, the people, are the ultimate source of the science charade. We have a powerful antipathy toward ambiguity and a deep faith in science to resolve all important disputes about human health.
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This powerful set of feelings and beliefs is magnified in the context of regulation of toxic risks. We will not tolerate either a decision that creates an avoidable risk of loss of life or a decision to spend large sums of money to avoid uncertain public health risks. 52 In short, we will not tolerate either uncertainties or trade offs in the context of regulation of toxic risks. Not surprisingly, our agents in government mirror our feelings and beliefs and translate them into statutes and judicial decisions.
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There is a problem, however. 58 It is usually impossible to determine directly whether exposure to low levels of a toxin causes serious harm. It is often easy to determine that exposure to higher levels causes serious harm, however. It would then be possible to extrapolate the effects of lower levels if we knew the shape of the doseresponse curve. In most cases, however, it is impossible to know the shape of the dose-response curve. 59 448 U.S. at 639-640. 13 magnitude of those trade offs. 54 We and our agents in the legislative and judicial branches simply will not tolerate that reality, however, as many scientists have discovered when they have attempted to explain the limits of science to a legislative or judicial forum.
Wagner described scores of occasions on which legislative and judicial bodies have refused to accept the basic realities that pervade toxic risk regulation and have insisted that scientists and agencies answer questions that science cannot answer. 55 The best single example is the Supreme Court's decision in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 56 popularly known as Benzene. An agency concluded that it is impossible to determine the level of exposure at which a substance that is known to induce cancer in humans at high exposure levels begins to induce cancer in humans at lower exposure levels. 57 That is not a controversial conclusion in the scientific community.
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Yet, when the agency confronted the Supreme Court with that regretable limit on the capability of science, a four-Justice plurality simply ordered the agency to do the impossible. 59 The plurality went on to demonstrate the Justices' abysmal ignorance of elementary toxicology by providing hypothetical 60 The Court said: "Some risks are plainly acceptable and others are plainly unacceptable. If, for example, the odds are one in a billion that a person will die from cancer from by taking a drink of chlorinated water, the risk clearly could not be considered significant. On the other hand, if the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline vapors that are 2% benzene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it." 448 U.S. at 655. 61 The Justices did not describe the size of the exposed population, the duration of exposure, or the shape of the dose-response curve. 62 Using plausible assumptions --an average of ten drinks of water per day by a population of 260 million over an average life span of 75 years and a linear dose-response curve --the risk the Justices characterized as "plainly acceptable" would kill 71,175 people over 75 years --949 people per year. [0.000000001 x 260,000,000 x 10 x 365 x 75 = 71,175]. It is much more difficult to make even a rough estimate of the number of people who would die as a result of the risk the Justices characterized as "plainly unacceptable." How many people "regularly inhale" gasoline vapors? With self-service gas stations ubiquitous everywhere in the U.S. except New Jersey, I would guess that only about 10,000 people fall in this category. Thus, the "plainly unacceptable" risk would kill about ten people --a tiny fraction of the number that would be killed by the "plainly acceptable" risk.. 14 illustrations of large and small risks that have amused and bewildered scientists ever since. 60 In describing the hypothetical small and large risks, the Justices omitted data that are crucial in assessing toxic risks. 61 Moreover, the risk the Justices characterized as "plainly acceptable" probably exceeds the risk they characterized as "plainly unacceptable."
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The ATA case is laced with symptoms of the science charade. The language of section 109(b)
provides a good starting point. Congress required EPA to establish a primary standard for each criteria pollutant at a level "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety" and a secondary standard "requisite to public welfare." The decisionmaking standard applicable to primary standards is a good illustration of health and safety absolutism. It suggests strongly that EPA is required to protect public health at all costs. Every court that has addressed the question has reached that conclusion --EPA is prohibited from considering either cost or feasibility in setting primary standards. 63 Taken literally, the language of section 109(b) also seems to require EPA to set primary standards somewhat below the level at which a pollutant is likely to kill people. Congress believed that EPA could (1) determine through the use of science the concentration of any pollutant at which the pollutant does not kill anyone; (2) set the primary standard a bit below that level; and, (3) set a still lower secondary standard that would avoid other forms of harm, e.g., reduced visibility. Congress also believed that every area of the country could meet the primary standard applicable to each pollutant by 1987; it mandated that result by statute in 1977.
64
At least in the case of particulates and ozone, each of Congress's beliefs was false. EPA can not use science to determine a concentration of particulates and ozone that does not kill some people.
Science can only provide rough estimates of the correlation between levels of pollutants and adverse public health effects, including death. Moreover, the best evidence available suggests strongly that the relationship between concentration and health effects lies on a continuum and that there is no level at which these two pollutants do not kill some people. 65 Thus, if EPA applied the two-step absolute 66 See 62 Fed. Reg. 38653, 38688. 67 See Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F. 2d 1130, 1161-1162. 68 See sources cited in note 65 supra. EPA salvaged this incoherent statutory standard by finding ambiguity in the term "public health."
It rejected an interpretation of "public health" that would equate the term with freedom from the risk of death attributable to pollution, and it interpreted section 109(b) to allow it to take an "integrative approach" in setting primary standards, rather than the two-step approach that section seems to require. 66 The courts acquiesced in EPA's creative interpretation. 67 In the case of ozone and particulates, EPA also implicitly interpreted "protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety" to be consistent with thousands of deaths per year. Even if every area of the country were in compliance with the new primary standards the court struck down in ATA, the best scientific evidence available suggests that ozone and particulates would continue to kill several thousand people per year. The dissenting opinion in ATA also contains a typical symptom of the science charade. The dissenting judge would have upheld EPA's choice of standards because he interpreted EPA as having drawn a line based on differences in kind, rather than differences in degree, of adverse health effects.
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He cited passages in the EPA statements of basis and purpose to support that interpretation. Thus, for instance, EPA explained its choice of ozone standards on the basis that "the most certain [ozone-] related effects, while judged to be adverse are transient and reversible." 70 The dissenting judge interpreted that statement as proof that EPA drew the line between permanent and irreversible effects and transitory and reversible effects, and/or between certain and uncertain effects. That interpretation is demonstrably false, but it is a typical judicial symptom of the science charade. We want science to provide clear answers to all important questions, so we find scientific answers where they do not, and can not, exist.
The EPA statement the dissenting judge relied on may be technically accurate, but it is seriously misleading. Indeed, it was almost certainly included in the agency's statement of basis and purpose in an attempt to mislead a reviewing court. The statement is yet another symptom of the science charade.
Since Congress and courts insist that agencies defend their decisions as objective applications of 71 See sources cited in notes 39 and 65 supra. 72 See sources cited in note 39 supra.
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science, an agency must use words that mislead a court into thinking that is what it has done.
If you parse the words the dissenting opinion quotes, and consider those words in the context of the several thousand pages in which EPA explains the basis for its actions, it is easy to spot the dissenting judge's interpretive error. Two features of EPA's explanation are sufficient alone to demonstrate the judge's error. First, EPA predicted that even compliance with the new primary standards is likely to produce several thousand deaths per year attributable to ozone and particulates.
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Death is not a "transient and reversible" effect, so EPA could not have meant to say that the health effects below 0.08 ppm are "transient and reversible." It said only that the most "certain" effects are "transient and reversible." Thus, for instance, at 0.08, non-fatal incidents of pulmonary distress are more certain than death, but that is also true at every other level. Second, EPA repeatedly referred to the health effects of ozone and particulates as lying on a "continuum," a relationship that is confirmed by looking at the EPA tables that show the estimated correlations between concentration levels and health effects. 72 EPA predicted only differences in degrees of health effects, not differences in kinds of effects.
The estimated number of deaths varies with the concentration level, but EPA predicted some deaths at each level it considered, including the level it chose. Of course, the degree of certainty of deaths increases from the 0.08 ppm level to the 0.09 ppm level, but it also increases at every other level.
At this point, it is useful to describe briefly the manner in which EPA (or anyone else) attempts to estimate the health consequences of exposure to toxic substances, and the massive range of uncertainty that surrounds all such estimates. EPA begins with studies that "find" particular relationships 73 The studies are listed at 62 Fed. Reg. 73 Each study looked at a different population that was exposed to different concentrations of pollutants for different periods of time. Some were "negative effects" studies, 74 i.e., they found no statistically significant difference in health effects of exposure to the different concentrations that were studied. Most found statistically significant differential effects, however, and most found adverse effects, including deaths, at levels well below the pre-existing primary standards. 75 The studies varied greatly, however, with respect to the magnitude of both the absolute effects and the differential effects of exposures to the concentrations studied. Each study was imperfect in important respects, e.g., the researchers could not definitively exclude the potential effects of other variables, and the findings of each study were qualified with reference to wide ranges of uncertainty attributable to variables such as sample size.
Each study was critiqued in detail in the over 100,000 comments. EPA responded to those critiques and explained why it attached greater significance to some studies than to others. EPA emphasized repeatedly that it "places greater weight on the overall conclusions derived from the studies . . . than on the specific concentration-response functions and quantitative risk derived from them" because of the "significant uncertainty" that surrounds the findings of any individual study. It is easy to sympathize with the extreme frustration of the ATA majority. It is also easy to criticize the majority's solution, however, and to urge its rejection. The majority holds that EPA's construction of section 109(b) is unconstitutional and that EPA cannot take any actions to implement that section until it adopts a new construction that includes "determinate, binding standards" that EPA and courts can use to determine "how much [pollution] is too much." 87 This is the point at which the majority fell prey to the science charade. It assigned EPA a task that EPA cannot perform. Indeed, no institution can perform that task.
IV. ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
In this section, I will evaluate four potential alternative constructions of section 109(b) that might appear to comply with the court's mandate. Before I begin that task, however, it is important to recognize that the general problem identified by the ATA majority is ubiquitous. We have tens of thousands of statutory and regulatory provisions that use numbers to draw critical distinctions. In a high proportion of cases, the line drawing process that produced those numbers is indistinguishable from the process EPA used to set the ozone standard at 0.08 ppm, rather than 0.07 or 0.09. Yet, the Republic has not fallen.
Two readily accessible numbers illustrate the point. You must be 18 to vote and 21 to buy alcohol in the United States. In both cases, the line drawing is based on maturity, but everyone knows that maturity does not arrive as a birthday present on either your 18th or 21st birthday. Maturation is a process that is both gradual and variable. Like the health effects of ozone and particulates, the correlation between age and maturity lies on a continuum with approximately equal intervals separating 18 year olds from 19 year olds, 19 year olds from 20 year olds, and 20 year olds from 21 year olds.
We could as easily defend decisions to make 21 the minimum age for voting and 18 the minimum age for drinking. Indeed, many states had minimum drinking ages below 21 until Congress effectively forced them to adopt 21 as the minimum age, and 21 was the minimum voting age until Congress changed it to 18 a couple of decades ago.
Of course, those necessarily arbitrary exercises in line-drawing were performed by Congress, . 91 The best examples of this rare type of congressional action are the Delaney Clauses, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and the hundreds of absurdly unrealistic statutory deadlines Congress imposes on regulatory agencies. The disastrous effects of these attempts to legislate with precision have been documented thoroughly. See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, Richard Merrill & Peter Shane, Administrative Law: The American Public Law System 128-147 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing some of the many problems created by the Delaney Clauses); Richard Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 En. L.J., 11-16 (1988) (discussing some of the many problems created by he Natural Gas Policy Act); Davis & Pierce, supra. note 19, at § 12.3 (discussing some of the many problems created by statutory deadlines).
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decisions that agencies now make every year. 88 EPA's ozone and particulate rules would seem to fall in that category. They require some institution to make tradeoffs between sacrificing about 10,000 lives per year and spending about fifty billion dollars a year in additional pollution control costs.
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The argument that Congress should make all "fundamental policy decisions" sounds good in theory, but it collapses completely upon consideration of the institutional limitations of Congress. 95 The D.C. Circuit would have to stretch the language of section 109(b) even further to hold that it permits EPA to consider costs, but such an interpretation is potentially defensible. CAA section 109(b) is one of only two federal statutory provisions that has been held to preclude an agency from considering the costs and feasibility of the standards it imposes. Wagner, supra. note 4, at 1668. Cass Sunstein and Richard Stewart have argued that all regulatory statutes should be interpreted to permit 25 must establish quantitative standards applicable to each of 130 criteria pollutants.
A. Cost-Benefit-Analysis I will begin by evaluating an alternative construction of section 109(b) that the ATA majority did not urge the EPA to consider. The ATA court could not urge the EPA to adopt a construction that permits, or requires, cost-benefit-analysis (cba). The D.C. Circuit has interpreted section 109(b) to preclude consideration of costs, and a panel of the D.C. Circuit is required to adhere to decisions issued by other panels. 92 There is no doubt, however, that the judges who comprised the majority in ATA would like EPA to adopt a statutory construction that permits, or requires, cba. Both judges are economically-oriented former academics who were appointed by President Reagan, 93 and the author of the opinion has urged agency use of cba in similar contexts. 94 In fact, in all likelihood, the judges who comprised the ATA majority were motivated in part by their desire to create a vehicle through which the en banc circuit will have the opportunity to reconsider, and potentially to overrule, the 1980 panel decision that held that EPA can not consider costs in implementing section 109(b 118 See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 38701. 119 See RIA.
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Heinzerling's study provides powerful evidence to refute the belief of many that cba is a useful tool for application by a reviewing court. Heinzerling found only two cases in which a court rejected an agency rule based on the court's application of cba. 116 That is not surprising, given the extraordinarily wide range of estimates that alternative cbas can yield. Scientifically illiterate and politically unaccountable judges are incompetent to resolve the science based, data-based, or value-based disputes that produce cba estimates that routinely vary by a multiple of over 1000. Thus, an interpretation of CAA section 109(b) that requires EPA to use cba in implementing CAA section 109(b) would not satisfy the ATA majority's demand for a "determinate, binding standard" that would allow EPA and reviewing courts "to state intelligently how much is too much." Cost-benefit-analysis is far too value-laden and indeterminate to perform that function.
I would much prefer an interpretation of section 109(b) that permits EPA to consider cba for two other reasons, however. First, I am confident that EPA did, in fact, consider its cba of the ozone and particulate rules, notwithstanding its claims to the contrary. 117 EPA states that it never considers cost in making decisions under section 109(b). 118 Yet, it always conducts a cba before it takes any such action. Thus, for instance, EPA prepared a 718-page cba of the proposed ozone and particulate rules. 119 EPA says that it prepares a cba only to aid states in the process of developing implementation plans, and never considers the cba in its own decisionmaking. 120 Yet, the cba is available to anyone on the internet. 121 I cannot believe that no one in the White House, no one in the Administrator's office, and no member of the Advisory Committee spent the two minutes necessary to obtain access to the cba and the half hour necessary to read the 22-page executive summary. If no one in the decisionmaking process actually considered costs, I cannot imagine how EPA chose an ozone standard of 0.08 ppm, rather than 0.07, 0.06, etc. It is clear that each reduction in concentration saves lives.
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It follows that any decisionmaker who actually ignores cost and feasibility would choose a lower standard than EPA chose.
At some point, the EPA Administrator undoubtedly met with the President to tell him that she was considering taking an action that she thought might save about 10,000 lives per year. No President would acquiesce in a decision of that magnitude without first discussing it with the Administrator. I cannot imagine any President who would not then ask the Administrator for some estimate of the cost of the action before acquiescing in the action proposed by the Administrator. I also cannot imagine any President who would acquiesce in the Administrators' proposed action if she responded with either: "I have no clue," or "I think it will require the deindustrialization of the United States." (I doubt that President Clinton has forgotten James Carville's famous advice: "It's the economy, stupid.") Thus, an interpretation of section 109(b) that allows EPA to consider costs would further the goal of transparent decisionmaking by allowing EPA to explain how it used cba in its decisionmaking process.
124 Like Heinzerling, I have emphasized the range of uncertainty that affects benefit estimates. Cost estimates also have wide ranges of uncertainty. The range of uncertainty of the cost of EPA's ozone and particulate rules is unusually large. The rules would only require states to take whatever actions each considers necessary to attain the new standards. Thus, the analyst had to predict how each state would respond to the new standards and how each source would respond to each new state rule over the next decade or so.
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Second, the ATA court would have found the EPA's cba reassuring if it had been given access to that document. Using the best available sources of data, plausible assessments of health risks, and defensible value-based methodological assumptions, EPA estimated that the new rules would cost an estimated $46.6 billion per year and would yield monetizable benefits in the range of $21.5 billion to $118 billion per year. 123 To its credit, EPA's cba repeatedly emphasized the uncertainties inherent in the process of preparing a cba. Cost-benefit-analysis is a useful decisionmaking tool only if the decisionmaker understands the massive range of uncertainties inherent in the process of estimating the costs and benefits of a proposed rule.
I have only one serious criticism of EPA's cba. By summarizing its cost estimate with a single figure, instead of a wide range, 124 and by summarizing its benefits estimate with reference to a relatively narrow range, EPA also has succombed to the science charade. It stated the results of its cba with much greater precision than the underlying science permits. EPA stated its benefit estimate in the form of a range, but the range it reported is far too small. Given the enormous range of uncertainty apparent in the findings of the one hundred plus epidemiological studies and the wide range of defensible value judgments that EPA could have used to calculate the estimated benefits of the rules, a competent analyst could easily defend as plausible benefit estimates that are both far below the low end of the 125 The literature on risk assessment and cost-benefit-analysis identifies and illustrates scores of ways in which an analyst's choice of plausible variables and methodologies can yield variations in benefit estimates that vary by a millionfold. See Heinzerling, supra. note 96: Wagner, supra. note 4; Latin, supra. note 47; McGarity, supra. note 78; Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra. note 79. Thus, for instance, Morrall might well rely on the findings of the several "negative effects" studies as the basis for his belief that the ozone and particulate rules would produce no health benefits. Conversely, use of the "Oregon approach," suggested by the ATA majority, would produce benefit estimates far above the upper end of the range of estimates reported by EPA. See text at notes 140-146 infra. 126 See sources cited in notes 39 and 65 supra. 127 175 F. 3d at 1038. 128 Id. at 1038. 34 range EPA reported and far above the high end of the range EPA reported. 125 It is also apparent from the underlying data that EPA could have used cba to support its choice of any standard between 0.07 and 0.10 ppm. 126 Thus, judicial access to the cba would be of no help whatsoever to a court that wants to be able to limit EPA's discretion. By contrast, it is helpful to a President because he can use his values as the basis for choosing where to draw the line between protection of public health and costs, given the massive uncertainties inherent in estimating both the costs and benefits of alternative standards. In a democracy, the President's values are the best available proxy for the values of the people.
B. Zero Health Risks
After noting that EPA was precluded from using cba by the D.C. Circuit's prior opinions, 127 the ATA majority suggested other ways in which EPA might be able to comply with the court's mandate.
First, "EPA could make its criterion the eradication of any hint of direct health risk. to set emissions levels that will eliminate the probability of adverse health effects. Given the available data on the relationship between human health and exposure to ozone and particulates, this criterion also would require EPA to set maximum permissible concentrations at levels that cannot be attained even with complete deindustrialization. There is no level of ozone or particulates above zero that does not produce a probability of loss of life. 133 It is hard to believe that the two economically-oriented once it identifies a significant safety risk. 138 Presumably, the ATA majority would be equally content with an EPA construction of CAA section 109(b) that requires EPA to issue primary air quality standards that provide a "high degree of protection" of the health of people who are exposed to criteria pollutants. After all, both the 1991 and 1994 opinions were written by the same judge who wrote the majority opinion in ATA.
I do not understand how EPA's adoption of a "high degree of protection" criterion for applying section 109(b) would have any effect whatsoever on its degree of discretion in issuing primary air quality standards or on a court's ability to review EPA actions taken pursuant to section 109(b). That construction seems to be nothing more than a way of paraphrasing the language of section 109(b) and the language EPA already uses to describe the criteria it uses to apply that section. A decisionmaking standard that requires a "high" degree of protection of human health obviously says nothing that is the least bit helpful in deciding how "high" is too high or too low. At most, such a standard would preclude EPA from "doing nothing at all" or from issuing ozone and particulate standards that are "a hair below the concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog." As I demonstrated in Part II, however, EPA does not have that discretion today.
The construction that OSHA adopted and the court approved obviously would have no effect on EPA's discretion to choose any standard at or below the 0.08 ppm standard it chose in its ozone 139 See note 41 supra. are stated, cba cannot be a "determinate, binding standard." It is premised on a series of highly subjective value judgments and it is subject to massive indeterminacy.
V. THE COURT'S REMEDY IS ANTIDEMOCRATIC
The ATA majority was motivated by a concern that has been voiced by many respected jurists unresponsive administrators" to make "fundamental policy decisions" that should be made only by elected officials. 147 Many people have characterized this phenomenon as a major flaw in our system of constitutional democracy. 148 For reasons that I will explain in part VI, I do not share that concern.
I do see, however, two major flaws in our system of constitutional democracy that would be created by the ATA majority's attempt to correct what it perceives to be a fatal flaw. The first flaw is obvious and immediate. Two unelected, life-tenured judges have decided that the United States should forego the opportunity to save about 10,000 lives per year in order to save about fifty billion dollars per year. Judges are the least politically accountable officials. They are the worst possible choice of officials to make such fundamental policy decisions in our system of constitutional democracy.
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The second unconstitutional and antidemocratic effect of the decision of the ATA majority is less direct and more subtle, but it is equally disturbing. As I understand the D.C. Circuit's 1991, 1994, and 1999 opinions, an agency can save its statute from a holding of unconstitutionality only by adopting a construction of its statute that binds the agency forever. If my interpretation is incorrect, the opinions are incoherent and meaningless. If an agency remains free to change its construction of the statute in the future, the court has had no effect whatsoever on the agency's degree of discretion or on the ability of reviewing courts to limit agency exercises of discretion. Under that interpretation, the D.C. Circuit has 150 467 U.S. 837. See Davis & Pierce, supra. note 19, at 3.5. Some commentors on a draft of this paper suggested a third plausible interpretation of the ATA opinion. They suggested that a newly-elected President could use a two-step decisionmaking process. Under this approach, EPA would first conduct a meta rulemaking in which it announces its construction of section 109(b), e.g., section 109(b) requires maximization of public health benefits short of deindustrialization. If a court upholds that construction, EPA would then conduct rulemakings to set new section 109(b) standards through application of that construction of the statute. That interpretation of the opinion raises a host of problems, however. For starters, no President would have any hope of completing the process during his term of office. 42 simply used the nondelegation doctrine as a bizarre vehicle to restate the pre-existing legal regime announced in cases like Chevron v. NRDC.
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If my interpretation is correct, the court is ordering President Clinton to make a fundamental policy decision that will bind all of his successors. Such a legal regime would create a real problem for our system of constitutional democracy. Its effects would include reducing significantly the incentive to vote in Presidential elections. In the 2000 election, it is a safe bet that we will have a choice between a Democrat candidate who promises to increase the degree of protection provided by environmental rules and a Republican candidate who promises to reduce the costs of government regulation. Millions of people will have the opportunity to vote their preferences with respect to the critical issue that the ATA majority characterizes as "how much is too much." Yet, if the legal regime created by the ATA majority is accepted as a permanent feature of our legal system, the voters who comprise a majority in that election will be frustrated to discover that their vote had no effect on any "fundamental policy decision." If hypothetical future President Gore is elected, he will be powerless to increase the degree of environmental protection provided by EPA rules. If hypothetical future President Bush is elected, he will be powerless to decrease the costs of 151 President's preferences. 151 There is ample reason to believe that Presidents routinely engage in that practice when an agency makes a "fundamental policy decision" and ample reason to believe that Presidential jawboning is invariably successful in that context. 152 Thus, it is far more accurate to attribute these decisions to the President, as the Supreme Court did in Chevron. 153 Moreover, the judicially-imposed prohibition on EPA's consideration of costs in setting air quality standards does not apply to the President. He can, and undoubtedly does, consider costs and benefits in determining his preferences and, hence, the action he urges the Administrator to take. 154 The standard Congress included in section 109(b) is far more determinate than the standards it often employs in statutes that delegate power to agencies. 155 I have attempted to demonstrate both in this article and elsewhere that it is absurd to expect Congress to make the types of decisions that EPA made in the ozone and particulate rulemakings, and that it would be destructive in many ways to demand that Congress make all decisions of this type. 156 In cases where Congress was able to respond to such a demand by making a decision, we would get terrible congressional decisions. 157 In cases where Congress was unable to comply with such a demand, we would get judicial resolutions of fundamental policy decisions by default. If I am right, we are left with limited choices. First, we could assign the discretion to make fundamental policy decisions to judges. That is one potential result of the
